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Australian Army Aviation's association with the Australian Army Signal Corps goes back a long way. In Vietnam, starting in 1967 through to the end of our involvement in 1972, 161 Recce Flight flew thousands of sorties for 547 Sig Troop, gathering vital Elint on enemy movements. At first 547's information was treated by Task Force HQ with some skepticism, however after the crucial battle of Long Tan, in August 1966, 547 Signals Troop demonstrated its "radio research" was a rich source of very accurate intelligence information. Before long the Task Force Commander confided that he would never make a decision for a deployment or action without taking into consideration the intel gathered by 547. Since Vietnam many of these activities have remained classified, including their operations with Army Aviation - the "shoosh" missions, initially flown by the Cessna 180 with the "spare" wheel.
Denis Hare now reveals some of the activities of 547 Signals Troop and how they contributed to the success of 1ATF Operations |
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SPECIALIST SIGNALS
547 Signal Troop in Vietnam
by
Denis Hare BEM
Preparing for War
547 Signal Troop's involvement in Vietnam began in March of 1966 when Army Headquarters proposed that the troop be allocated in direct support of the first Australian Task Force (1ATF). 1ATF was due to assume the responsibility for the security of Phuoc Tuy Province in May 1966, following Australia's initial deployment a year earlier of the First Battalion Group attached to the American 173rd Air Borne Division based at Ben Hoa. The Troop was initially only established at half strength of fifteen men with Captain Trevor Richards appointed to command the Troop. This was an appropriate appointment as Captain Richards had been involved with a similar unit during the Borneo Campaign.
The need to deploy 547 Signal Troop in Vietnam was largely due to the appreciation of two officers, Lieutenant Colonel Ken Whyte and Major Colin Cattanach. Major Cattanach spearheaded the Troop's deployment with a visit to Vietnam. Whilst in Vietnam he made contact with local Australian and Allied authorities and did much to ensure that the unit would be committed to a solid role and his enthusiasm was reflected in the high standard of commitment and tasking which he set for the Troop.
7 Signal Regiment. 547 Signal Troop was a sub unit of 7 Signal Regiment and soldiers were taken from the Regiment's outposts throughout Australia. 7 Signal Regiment would feed replacement specialist Electronic Warfare (EW) personnel to 547 Signal Troop during its deployment in Vietnam.
Deployment. In a frenzied round of visits between 12th and 20th May 1966 the details were settled for the troop's deployment. The troop was to take its own weapons, stores and vehicles but would receive its maintenance and administrative support from 103 Signal Squadron which at that time was serving as the Task Force Signal Squadron. In the subsequent years a strong bond of friendship was built between these two units and 103 Signal Squadron's replacement unit, 104 Signal Squadron.
On 21st May 1966 the unit's advance party left Borneo Barracks (7 Signal Regiment) for embarkation at Sydney on HMAS Sydney. On 8th June 1966 landing craft of HMAS Sydney deposited the advance party of 547 Signal Troop on the beach at Vung Tau. The main party of the Troop was moved by air from Sydney to Vung Tau via Saigon. On 14th June 1966 they met up with the advance party and the following day headed off to Nui Dat. There, the OC of 103 Signal Squadron, Major Mudd allocated the Troop a position opposite the Task Force Headquarters, fairly close to where the communications center was later to be built.
Operations commenced on 24th June 1966 and were continuous for the next five and a half years. Operationally, the troop was committed to a role of intermediary between allied 'Radio Research Units' and the Task Force Headquarters. This was implemented quickly but with a few teething problems. Within a fortnight of arrival at Nui Dat, independent research began. Radio equipment provided some problems as it had suffered a rough passage and was not handling the local heat very well. Repairs had to be effected under adverse conditions, without the services of a technician. |
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547 radio room. Conditions in Vietnam were trying on both equipment and personnel. High temperatures and soaking humidity are the nemesis of electronic equipment - especially the predominately vacuum tube powered systems then in use. These required high voltages and produced large amounts of heat while operating. The situation was also aggravated by the lack of a service technician in the first few months of operation. Much of 547's success is owed to the persistence and ingenuity of its personnel. - always willing to improvise and find a work-around for any problem. |
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Highly classified for many years is the radio work of 547 Signal Troop in Vietnam. For example in the lead up to the Battle of Long Tan, two weeks before the Battle, 547 identified the radio callsign of D275 (VC) Main Force Regiment, a fresh unit to Phuoc Tuy Province and under the control of HQ 5 (VC) Division. On the same day the Troop fixed the location of 275 Regiment's transmitter by radio direction finding. That, in the Troops opinion, should have stirred the possums - or mongooses - at HQ 1 ATF. But it caused hardly a ripple.
One of the problems was the little understanding, by the staff of HQ 1 ATF of the importance of information provided by 547 Signal Troop at the time. Also only four people outside the Troop at Nui Dat, had been told the sources of 547's information by the Australian Department of Defense.(The Commander, Operations Officer and the G2 plus G3 Int). US intelligence came in reams, but often it was not parochial enough for the Task Force, so most reliance was placed on reports from Australian sources, especially patrols. Also the Task Force HQ treated intelligence from the South Vietnamese Army and Police as suspect due to the conflicting nature of their reports.
On the 29th July 1966, 547 reported a considerable increase in radio traffic from the east, which suggested to the Troop OC (Captain Trevor Richards) and his analysts that something significant was in the offing. On the same day, the 547 operators located the transmitter of 275 Regiment a couple of kilometers north of Xuyen Moc, it then approached the Nui Dat base in steady deliberate stages, as though moving tactically, taking sixteen days to cover the seventeen kilometers from there to the area of Nui Dat 2 (near Long Tan), with 547 operators locating the transmitter twelve more times along the way from the 2 to 14 August.. |
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Map showing the locations of D275 plotted by 547 SIG Troop as the enemy moved west from the Xuyen Moc area towards 1 ATF between 29th July and 18th of August 1966. The force was later estimated to be almost two thousand strong - a figure supported by post-war records which indicated it may have been in excess of 2500. Its aim was singular - attack the newly established Australian Base of Nui Dat and inflict as many casualties as possible. The mission was purely political - the enemy forces didn't intend to hold the position, but to cause an outcry among the Australian public which would demand withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam. Such was the political nature of the war. |
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On the 18th August 1966, D Company, 6 RAR, near Long Tan fought a major battle, which is now known as the 'Battle of Long Tan' against a force now know to have comprised of over two thousand enemy soldiers. At 1700 hours as the besieged D Company were requesting a desperate resupply of ammunition by helicopter, another significant event occurred. The Task Force Commander, at last, called the OC of 547 Signal Troop to his side and asked for his analysis of the enemy attacking D Company.
Richards had no problem responding in detail, relieved that his team efforts had, at last, won recognition. From that day the Australian 'Agency' charged with passing on US information quietly became an agency producing and passing on its own information back to US authorities, as well as the Task Force.
It was not until February 1967 that the Troop welcomed its first technician aboard. With the close liaison established with the HQ 1 ATF, it became apparent that the Troop could perform more than an intermediary role. In fact, some agencies soon began to request more of the Troop's results and soon became dependent on the Troop as a source of information. This fact was acknowledged in a letter of commendation from the Troops Operational Command to the highest authority concerned.
Early in 1967, the Troop workload was increased with the introduction of aerial experiments. Operators, who seldom ascended more than twenty feet up a mast, now found themselves being hurled around the sky in a Cessna 180A belonging to 161 Independent Reconnaissance Flight. Early tests consisted of a Receiver with a length of 'copper' wire trailing out of the aircraft. This wire (aerial) was wound in/out of the aircraft on a 'fishing reel'. Meanwhile, purpose built equipment was being designed and tested at 'Weapons Research Establishment' in Australia. The equipment was simple, but very effective and accurate. Once operational, the skills of the 161 Independent Reconnaissance Flight pilots contributed greatly to the accuracy of and credence placed upon the end results attained by the Troop. |
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Cessna 180A with ARDF equipment. Antennae is in the up position. Though relatively simple in design (partly dictated by the space/weight limitations of the Cessna) this "MK1" equipment fit proved remarkably effective. 161 pilots were often able to compare the results gained by 547 SIG Troop and several US Army ELINT units which operated out of 161 Recce Flt) to learn that 547's findings were often more accurate than those collected by the higher tech US equipment. |
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Airborne Radio Direction Finding.
The Troop commenced Operational Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) missions in August 1967 with equipment mounted in 161 Independent Reconnaissance flight's Cessna 180A aircraft. Allied visitors to the Troop were surprised by its capabilities and many Senior Officers and boffins flew missions in the aircraft to see the gear in operation.
In this period Corporal Dick Schafer of 547 Signal Troop earned fame as an ARDF operator. His first ARDF incident was simply a matter of running out of gas in the Cessna 180A. The pilot just managed to glide home to Nui Dat (Luscombe Field), to Dick's joy! The second incident in September 1968 was more serious. His Cessna developed propeller problems which required the engine to be shutdown and they had to force land into a water filled paddy field twenty kilometres north of Nui Dat near Route 2 in the vicinity of the Courtenay rubber plantation. |
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The remains of A98-043. Cause of the engine shutdown was a fractured propeller link which sent one blade fully fine, the other fully course - a situation which would result in the engine quickly shaking loose from its mounts. After transmitting a Mayday call, then shutting down the engine, pilot Steve Tizzard elected to put down in a water filled paddy field. The touch down was perfect, however, the starboard wheel struck a hidden stone-pile beneath the water (probably the only one in the field!..ed). The resulting "water-loop" ripped off the gear strut and compressed Steve against the instrument panel. Fortunately he and his systems operator, Dick Schafer, were only bruised. They then evacuated the aircraft and prepared to make a stand against a force of about fifteen troops dressed in black...
043 was later slung beneath a Chinook and taken back to Nui Dat where during the landing approach rotor recirculation cause load instability. The load had to be cut loose and 043's last flight was straight down for about 100ft.
Photo from Denis Hare's collection |
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After crash landing Dick scrambled from the broken aircraft to face an encircling patrol dressed in black. The pilot (Lieutenant Steve Tizzard) and Dick prepared for a desperate stand. The tallest member of the patrol put his hands into the air shouting "Don't shoot, I'm an American adviser". To this day Dick and the pilot are not sure whether they or the adviser enjoyed the greater relief.
Dick, the pilot and their highly classified equipment were extracted under the protection of US helicopter gunships and an SAS protection patrol, which arrived within minutes of the forced landing. Subsequently it was discovered that the aircraft came to a stop on the EW antenna pod after its undercarriage collapsed in the crash landing. The EW equipment was undamaged in the incident however the aircraft was a write-off because it was dropped in the recovery operation.
Upgraded ARDF. Early 1970 saw the installation of upgraded equipment in 161 Independent Reconnaissance Flight's new Pilatus Porter aircraft. The new equipment proved to be a joy to operate and a vast improvement on the older models, much to the delight of the operators and technicians.
An example of the number of hours flown and sorties carried out per month in support of 547 Signal Troop by 161 Independent Reconnaissance Flight in 1971 is as follows:
June 1971, 181 hours, 100 sorties. July 1971, 171 hours, 93 sorties.
November 1971, 312 hours, 156 sorties. December 1971, 84 hours, 41 sorties
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In early 1970, 161 Recce Flight began phasing out the Cessna and replacing them with turbine powered Pilatus Porters. With increased lifting capacity and more interior space, this enabled the improved "MK2" ARDF to be carried. Again this Australian designed system proved it could match more sophisticated US equipment. Sorties in the Porter ranged further and were often for greater duration than the Cessna. Porter missions also introduced night operations - a challenge to aircrew, as a vital factor of every flight was the ability to visually fix their position during DF runs. Some interesting solutions to this were devised by 161 - including support aircraft dropping flares. These were pre GPS days) . |
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The Cell. October 1968 also saw the arrival of more experimental Direction Finding (DF) single station locator equipment. The equipment was to be located within the Nui Dat perimeter but away from the Troop's main operational base. The equipment was called the 'Cell' and was based on the World War II German 'Wullenweber' aerial system which used four aerials in a circle. The single station locator pinpointed the source of the radio wave by measuring the phased time and angle difference between two incoming radio waves striking the antennas in the circle and calculating the angle of deflection from the ionosphere. The Cell was a source of interest to many allied units. Streams of visitors came, and once the complexities of its functions were mastered and the operators and technicians gained confidence, the project went on to produce valuable results. This single station location method developed by Australia is now used world wide in sophisticated HF DF Systems.
Forward Deployments. With the Task Force Headquarters deploying forward in operations, it was also necessary to improve 547 Signal Troop's representation at the forward HQ. An Armoured Command Vehicle (ACV) '84 Delta' was allocated to the Troop and was fitted and wired for the necessary communications equipment. By working on the Troops own links, the Troop representative was able to give rapid replies to staff questions.
Re-location to Vung Tau. News of the Australian withdrawal came in August 1971. The Troop re-deployed to Vung Tau on 6th October, with no loss of circuit time. On 17th October 1971, the rear echelon joined the rest of the Troop at Vung Tau. They had remained at Nui Dat, with the ACV, and a two man rear party. 547 Signal Troop was the last vehicle to leave Nui Dat. On 13th December 1971, 547 Signal Troop closed operations in Vung Tau. The flying team ceased operations at 1200hrs and the Communications Centre at 1800hrs. On 23rd December 1971, in the early hours of the morning, 547 Signal Troop boarded the buses for the airport. At 1000hrs, 23rd December, the Troop departed Vietnam.
On Wednesday 9th February 1972, 7 Signal Regiment at Borneo Barracks (Cabarlah, Queensland) held a special parade to welcome 547 Signal Troop home. Major Herb O'Flynn, the last Officer to Command the Troop, then disbanded the Troop and returned the personnel to 7 Signal Regiment
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About the Author
Denis Hare, BEM, has assembled a fascinating history of the Signal Corps involvement in the Vietnam War. This is a comprehensive work which starts prior to Australia’s first commitment of advisors in 1962, and ends with the pullout after US President Nixon’s negotiated Peace Accords with the North Vietnamese of 1972. Titled "Pronto in South Vietnam 62-72", it’s written in an easy style which covers all Signals Corps units that served in Vietnam.
Denis Hare’s story is worth reading. He explains the difficulties the early units worked under, from monsoon rains which grew fungus on the operators to equipment which baked in the sun – with solder joints melting from the heat and power overload! Rarely do we appreciate the efforts of those people who put up with such conditions and through sheer dedication, cunning and experience devised equipment work-arounds which kept Australian Units in contact and provided those links which proved so vital to us all.
The complete history is available on CD-ROM (Win Systems) or many of the modules (in PDF format) can be downloaded from the 104 Sigs website. The CD-ROM contains an extensive photo library, some of which have been reproduced in the above article. For any Vietnam Veteran, this is a worthy addition to your collection. For serving members (of any corps) it should be read as it gives an insight into situations you one day may face. It's worth the price just for the photos.
www.au104.com
or contact Denis Hare
dhare-sigs@powerup.com.au |
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