This seminal paper, "The Tactical Air Support Group", by AAAvn Association member Owen Eather, first appeared in the "Australian Defence Force Journal" in January, 1993 and eventually caused a significant adjustment in RAAF thinking on Close Air Support. |
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Part One
An Army without Tactical Air Support
The defence of Australia, particularly in the North, by the Australian Defence Force (ADF), aims to prevent a hostile force 'gaining a foothold on any part of our territory',(Ref 1) and requires close coupled tactical support for the surface commander. The means of providing this tactical air support, from land, naval or air forces, must be capable of reliable and immediate reaction to the surface commander's directions in meeting an unfolding battle situation that is unable to be appreciated from any other view point but his.
This need is at odds with the role conflict that has developed within the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) since the end of the Pacific War. Provision of low level, ready reaction tactical Close Air Support clashes with the strategic deep strike and air superiority roles of the RAAF (essentially, the Control of the Air campaign). This has been tacitly recognised by the RAAF (Ref 2 ) in handing over the operation of battlefield helicopters to the Army. Asset procurement has progressively skewed RAAF equipment capability to meet these strike and air superiority roles. This process has degraded the probability of these assets being deployed in the close support role against the most feasible small-scale incursion 'as the F- 111 and the FA- 18 ... are likely to be of little use.' The RAAF has evolved into effectively, a strategic arm as the extreme cost of its equipment has steered its concentration on this contribution to the ADF.
This expensive inventory, restricted in its sophistication to coping with only the most conventional of defence threats, has led the RAAF to the doctrinal rationalisation that it has 'Potential to substitute air power for land or sea power' and that it 'seems pointless to draw the distinction between tactical and strategic air power' (Ref 3) Thus to the RAAF, surface combat, especially on land, may have little future advantage in national defence and should not represent a significant claim on air power assets.
That this strategic role must predominate is also propounded by the RAAF in an officially sanctioned paper, 'The Leading Edge'.(Ref 4) The view of the Chief of the Air Staff's (CAS) office as expressed in this paper, is that RAAF assets must be controlled at the highest - that is - strategic level; namely by the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF). Primacy of RAAF assets and their strategic role, in the authors' words, is necessary as:
' The dispatch of such limited and valuable re-sources on missions against even some regional forces should not be considered or condoned. ' (Ref 5)
However, the CDF, or any Commander in Chief, will rarely have an intimate feel of the developing 'immediate battle' afforded the local surface commanders. Physical remoteness, communication delays and even disagreement could lag the response of tactical air support assets in the CAS model, to the point of ineffectiveness. ( Ad 1) Recent conflicts have shown that: 'Thirty per cent of (available air effort was used for) immediate or troops-in-contact situations.' (Ref 6) and that for 'ground forces very high local mobility of firepower (is) probably best provided by organic helicopters and other suitable aircraft.' (Ref 7) RAAF doctrine and equipment are incompatible with the very real air power need to provide aircraft as flexible long range artillery in close air support'.
The RAAF now proposes that the strategic role is the only justifiable employment for its assets. This has left a doctrinal inconsistency that has come about due to the absence of attention to the Close Air Support requirements of the surface commander in the intimate battle, particularly the land battle. RAAF thinking discounts the land battle, focusing its attention on the northern 'sea-air gap', and maintains that if they are unsuccessful and the enemy 'does land in strength, we will have lost anyway'.(Ref 8) Thus, the 'Thirty per cent' capability has been atrophied as a doctrinal concern and equipment requirement in the RAAF, but still remains a vital need in support of ADF surface operations.
Therefore there is a need to evaluate the means within the ADF, to provide timely, flexible and organic tactical air support to surface commaders, maritime or land, in an economical, reliable and effective manner. There is also the need to resolve the effects of the role conflict within the RAAF, between its tactical and strategic demands. This article discusses both these needs in the concept of the Tactical Air Support Group (TASG).
This paper will:
a. Examine historical trends in operational control and deployment of tactical air support in surface battles.
b. Show that the RAAF, from its published doctrine, has discounted the surface battle in its approach to its role.
c. Suggest a low cost but high utility solution to the current degradation of Close Air Support in the ADF.
Emphasis will be on examining the Close Air Support requirements of the land battle. This is not intended to ignore the very real needs of the maritime surface commander but merely to indicate it is a subject worthy of additional debate within the framework of Close Air Support to the ADF.
