Dear Editor,

I thoroughly enjoyed Chicken Hawk’s article and commend the Association for creating this forum. I too would like to contribute under a pseudonym, not because I am “gun-shy”, but because I feel it adds some mystique to the author’s identity.

Whilst I concur with Chicken Hawk’s (CH) sentiments, I also support the thrust of JSL’s posting. However, I drew a different inference from the article than JSL, and I would like to put my “two bob’s” worth in.

Disregarding the inaccuracies, there is probably some substance to Chicken Hawk’s assertion that we have lost the “Army” part of our Corps name. JSL does a good job in using doctrinal references and current officer training paradigms to support his argument of “no case to answer”. However, there is much more to inculcating officers with a warrior ethos, I prefer this description to that of “warfighting culture”, than reading PAMS’s and attending courses.

Like leadership, acquiring the warrior ethos is not as simple as completing a course or reading a book, and despite what many pilots may think, the term is not confined to the role of flight lead. Acquiring it is a gradual, conditioning process that is heavily reliant on experience and the influence of those that “have it”. In the Australian Army, we rely on RMC to begin this process for our junior officers. In the case of the traditional Arms Corps, a young officer is then eventually developed into a competent junior leader, and commander, of soldiers. At this early stage, the influence of “ethical” OC’s, WO’s and SNCO’s is crucial. Sadly, the same can no longer be said for the majority of Army pilot’s.

By necessity, the rapid expansion of Army Aviation after the battlefield helicopter transfer required an effective recruiting strategy to fill pilot vacancies; read SSO scheme. These recruits needed to be fast tracked into the cockpit and thus were not trained at RMC, a practice that continues today. Further, as an inducement to enlist, Army actively implied that this program was an expeditious path to the airlines. Consequently, we reaped what we sewed.

Now, I am not questioning the competence or courage of the SSO’s as pilots; in the main they are first rate. However, most, and I accept that I am guilty of making the same generalisations as CH, view the Army as a means to an end. There is a distinct lack of the warrior ethos in these pilots, which is the result of not being “indoctrinated” into the brotherhood via RMC etc.

The problem is exacerbated by the shortage of GSO’s, and importantly, the absence of a meaningful role for our WO’s and SNCO’s. The Corps, or more specifically, its leaders, still fail to appreciate the impact this policy has had on our credibility as an integral part of the combined arms team, or on the ethical development of our young GSO’s and OR’s.

Although JSL points out that the “battle has been fought and won” over the ranks issue, I would like to share a Corps dinner experience with your readers who were not present on this particular occasion. Former CDF, Gen Sir Phillip Bennett, was the official guest of honour at the birthday dinner in 1996 (I think). He presided over the helicopter transfer when he was the “man”, was a badged pilot, and a courageous and inspiring leader of soldiers. While reflecting on the growth of the Corps since the transfer, he remarked how disappointed he was that the Corps had never seriously investigated the creation of a NCO pilot scheme. At this point, there was a great deal of navel gazing among senior members of the Corps!

Army Aviation currently has a commissioned to OR ratio of approximately 1:1, which equates to about 300 officers, the majority of whom the Corps considers unsuitable for command appointments. In view of the concept of command and control that sets the Army’s rank levels, no other Corps in the Australian Army has, or would seek to justify, such an imbalance. By comparison, the battalions of the RAR have approximately 250 officers in total. I would love to be a Cav Sqn Cmdr with 20 officers in my sub-unit whose only role is to drive an APC…NOT!

In concluding, I would like to borrow some adjectives from JSL, who in a mature capability, would possibly be a WO2 pilot. The proposition that all pilots must be officers is preposterous; it must be, isn’t it? Otherwise the Brits must be incredibly stupid! In my view, the loss of a letter from our Corps abbreviation (A?Avn) is the result of this ridiculous policy

Get Some!

The Door Gunner

P.S. Maybe a reader with the requisite background knowledge can, in a future article, clarify the basis and justification for the officer pilot policy?

From the editor: We believe this is a legacy from those very early days when Air Op (Arty) was seen as a prime requirement (almost the ONLY justification) for Army Pilots. Back then (50-60's) only officers were qualified to act as FOOs for artillery shoots, therefore this tranferred to the requirement for pilots to be commissioned. In my opinion this reasoning is somewhat archaic, and has become entrenched in the system. There's no reason why any "other rank" can't be taught the skills required.

Chicken Hawk Strikes Back