If being cautious or skeptical about the French with-holding spares, shutting down software or generally interferring if they don't "approve" of our military involvement then I'm xenophobic up to my eyeballs. Just look at their record. No one questions the aircraft's capabilities, that's not the point.

The Tigers are expensive White Elephants that will spend most of their service life posing for camera shots and playing silly buggers in air shows. Because of them, Army Aviation will lack grass roots recon capability, a capability that could have been used a week or so ago by 2 RAR in Iraq for convoy cover when they were ambushed.

Davo,

3 October, 2006

I have to agree with Davo. The Tiger might be a fine aircraft, but it already suffers from the "Koala syndrome". Our troops need small armed recce choppers such as the Bell 429 or even the Hughes Defender as outline by Chickenhawk. I know this will bring screams of outrage, but the Tiger decision was a bad one, probably bordering on disaster. Good aircraft BUT!

And as Davo mentioned, our troops need recon in an operational area now. Too many don't realise what a close run battle that ambush was. It may have been avoided if we'd had recon cover available to those men.

Australian Army Aviation failed to provide it.

Hawkeye

4 October, 2006

I would like to support Chickenhawk's comments and add a few of my own.  But first, I would reinforce his on the sterling job our soldiers are doing in all their deployments, not just Aviation.  We have just had word of the recent action by 2 RAR in Iraq, where the finest traditions of the Australian Army were upheld - particularly those like these that see the enemy very sorry they took on the Australians.  The brisk and no nonsense way the action was carried out by all ranks should be a point of pride for all and a particular credit to our superb young men.  The Anzac tradition is very safe in their hands.

But I should continue on that example and ask, where was Army Aviation?  Not the fault of current Army fliers, who would support their Infantry comrades in an inkling. No, it lies with the equipment or, rather, its unsuitability that is the cause.  The much vaunted Tiger would be an orphan in the Iraq environment, completely dominated by US inventory aircraft that would make the Tiger almost impossible to maintain and keep up to an effective availability rate.

Then, would the French supply spares for activities in a war of which it disapproves? Can we trust them? They have a history of breaking promises when it suits them. Has anybody also thought that, of all the "Coalition" aircraft types, the Tiger most loudly shouts 'Australian Forces'.  It would become a target of honor for the Jihadists and attract even more attention than the unfortunate Apaches mentioned by Chickenhawk, making it doubly dangerous for our crews to fly.

Also, the sophisticated Apaches are finding the harsh, dry and dusty operational theatre difficult to handle - so much so that they must be kept in air conditioned converted shipping containers when not in use.  This limits their deployment and, therefore, their usefulness.  They are on an hour's response time - quite ludicrous for a close support type.  I defy anyone to tell me the Tiger would not face similar, even more debilitating, limitations if, and when it might be deployed.

A point was made in the “Tactical Air Support Group" paper elsewhere on this website, that the Germans and the Russians learned the lesson that Army support aircraft types had to be rugged, numerous and, consequently, relatively cheap as their attrition rate was likely to be high (although, not necessarily for crews) What has changed? 

We now have a virtual technological Koala in the Tiger - not to be exported, not to be shot at. 

Toby’s assertion that the Tiger cannot be risked in high MANPADS (?) environment is risible. Close Air Support is just that, not some RAAF type “Control of the Air” campaign waged at 40000 feet. Army Aviators must operate on the deck, just like the Infantry and the rest of the Army.This smacks dangerously of the isolationist attitude of the RAAF of ten years or so ago – where the hardware became so expensive it became more important to preserve it than engage the enemy.

I can hear the gales of laughter now, when Toby’s argument is read, in Infantry units where the soldiers have, at most, only body armor to protect them and in Corps of Transport, where it and its predecessor, Service Corps, have routinely and continuously trundled around in tiger country (forgive the pun) driving slow, skylined, soft skinned vehicles over four or five wars, including Vietnam where RPG7s where thick on the ground.

Imagine 2 RAR soldiers' joy at having available a rugged close support RW last week, like a proven Blackhawk with weapons pack - as had been proposed in the nineties - or a pair of the newer Bell 429, small but nimble. Able to pour fire into the enemy location during the Infantry assault, our action that day would have been all the more effective.  Even a slow (and relatively cheap) fixed wing Pilatus Porter, delivering pin point ordnance would have been better than what was available from Australian Army Aviation - which was nothing.

Will we ever see this protected species out of the wildlife park at Oakey? Time will tell but I'd bet it lives out its life in magnificent and protected isolation.

Holdfast

5 October, 2006